Saturday, December 12, 2015

DarkBot detection using Canada Cyber security servers.

One of our security server at a client have detected some IOC's that look like darkbot.
when we looked at the pcap files we did see why ... below are some rules that Canada cyber sensor have triggered.

For more information: 
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-337A
http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/threat/encyclopedia/entry.aspx?Name=Worm%3AWin32/Dorkbot#tab=2


This first screen is the first request to via DNS to  wipmania.com something that is normal of darkbot.

Next screen is the HTTP request to the same domain.


Tuesday, December 8, 2015

We have updated our site

We decided to get a new face left for our website .. ? what do you think ..

Some of the new things:
1. always redirect to https.
2. very small foot print. under 1 mega byte.
3. should work on any screen.
4. no executable, Good luck trying to hack this l33t ;-)




Our site screen from before : 

 

Wednesday, August 26, 2015

hard drive forensics

Not your average day at Canada Cyber, we usually deal with network security and forensics, but this week we have to do a hard drive recovery on a laptop, that is suspected to be the root of a problem in a client network. The drive mbr/GPT was removed and before that it was formatted via malware. Ironically this is the 2nd hard drive we had to deal with this week. first one was for a client that lost his Raid Config. biggest problem with all of this, is the time the software needs to get things back.




Tuesday, July 7, 2015

Cyber attacks via DDOS On one of the servers we are securing

We thought this is interesting to share with you, this is a chart from a 12 min span from a our security sensor showing over 1.2 million TCP port 80 request to a web server running IIS on a windows 2012 R2.

Our systems have been able to identify that and a quick e-mail/sms was sent to our staff who then within minutes contacted the owner of the server.

the diagram also shows the source nation, this is a DDOS attack as the attack was conducted using 100,000  of unique IP address.


Wednesday, May 20, 2015

Google Cloud Terms of agreement are changing.

Dear Google Cloud Platform Customer,

We've made some changes to the Online Google Cloud Platform License Agreement and to the following documents incorporated into that License Agreement:
  • Google Cloud Platform Service Specific Terms
  • Google Cloud Platform Services Summary
  • Service Level Agreements (SLAs)
  • Google Cloud Platform Services Subject to the Deprecation Policy
  • Technical Support Services Guidelines for Google Cloud Platform Services
  • Cloud Platform Data Processing and Security Terms

Google Cloud Platform Terms of Service

We've updated the Google Cloud Platform License Agreement to, among other things:
  • Simplify and clarify certain provisions, such as those covering your rights to use Google Cloud Platform services and Google's rights to use data you provide in those services
  • Update the indemnification provisions
  • Add Data Processing and Security Terms
  • Allow for charges to be made in select local currencies
  • Add a Google Cloud DNS Service Level Agreement

Google Cloud Platform Service Specific Terms

We've updated the Service Specific Terms to, among other things:
  • Make the data location provisions more clear and uniform
  • Add data location provisions for Google Compute Engine
  • Add certain exclusions from the data location provisions
  • Clarify certain Prediction API obligations
  • Include terms applicable to use of third-party software in conjunction with Google Compute Engine
  • Include terms applicable to the use of Google Cloud Security Scanner
  • Add language to clarify use of Sustained Usage Discount pricing
  • Add a restriction against using the Google Cloud Platform services to provide network transport or sell bandwidth

Google Cloud Platform Services Summary

We've updated the services summary to:
  • Add descriptions of Google Container Engine and Google Cloud Monitoring
  • Add descriptions of Managed VMs and Google Cloud Endpoints to the Google App Engine service description
  • Add a description of Google Cloud DNS to the Google Compute Engine service description
  • Add descriptions of Google Cloud Security Scanner, Google Genomics API and Google Cloud Pub/Sub as new "Other Google Cloud Platform Services"

Service Level Agreements

We've updated the following Service Level Agreements (SLAs) to clarify that they don't apply to features designated "Alpha" or "Beta".

We've also updated the Google Compute Engine SLA to, among other things:
  • Add Google Compute Engine service load balancing as covered by that SLA
  • Add loss of persistent disk access to the Instance Downtime definition.

Google Cloud Platform Services Subject to the Deprecation Policy

We've made a clarification to exclude from our Services under the Deprecation Policy versions, features, and functionality labeled "Alpha" or "Beta". We've also added Google BigQuery to the list of services subject to the Deprecation Policy.

Technical Support Services Guidelines for Google Cloud Platform

We've updated the Technical Support Services Guidelines to provide that, although Google has no obligation to provide technical support services for Alpha or Beta versions, features, or functionality of the Services, we will consider requests at these development stages on a case-by-case basis. We also shortened the Platinum P1 target initial response time.

Cloud Platform Data Processing and Security Terms

We've updated the Data Processing and Security Terms to clarify the definitions of Subprocessor and Third Party Suppliers.

Summary of Changes

You can review a summary of the main changes to the Google Cloud Platform License Agreement, as well as view the prior version of the Google Cloud Platform License Agreement for the next 30 days.

In addition, you can review a summary of the main changes to the Service Specific Terms, Services summary, SLAs, Services under the Deprecation Policy, and Technical Support Services Guidelines. You can also view the prior version of the Service Specific Terms for the next 30 days.

Sincerely,

--The Google Cloud Platform team

© 2015 Google Inc. 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043
You have received this mandatory email service announcement to update you about important changes to Google Cloud Platform or your account.

Wednesday, May 6, 2015

Compute Cloud Engine Security


One of our bigger clients uses google compute engine as a services. And then they resell the service as a managed service.

They came to us and told us that they suspect one of the servers they own is now a command and control server. And that the entire IP block for that provider has been black listed and is affecting the MX record for the mail servers.

So this is the problem:

1.       The clients need the services back ASAP.

2.       The Client is a service provider to another provider (2 x kill chain).

3.       The Client is very good with services and networking (but no security Skill).

4.       All of this is in the CLOUD. That is run by google.

5.       The legal issues with this and the forensics of this problem require at least 4 organizations, Google, The direct client that contacted us. The secondary client that is 0Wned.  And last but not so obvious the users, IT staff that might have been 0wned

So first thing we do we ask for some variables:

1.       IP address.

2.       Domain names.

3.       Credentials to access inside virtual machines and main google Compute Engine.

4.       List of users with direct access to all of the above.

We get one of the security engineers to look at it. And within 1 hour he identifies the problem.

He is like oh ……. Just look at the logs …..

We are: what logs ….

The google compute logs.

We are: what is a google compute logs.

It shows someone logging in at strange time and then doing strange things.

 

 

In short, after a longer investigation, someone was able to hijack one of the admin’s Gmail account from the owned client that has admin access to that VM instance. He then was able to start a new server with no one being aware.

The server was a 2012 R2 server that is a standard google compute engine. Then the hacker changed the firewall and allowed VPN services via PPTP( we suspect this was the command and control channel(C2)).

Conclusion

We changed the password and recover question for the 0Wned user. We then removed the VM instance Server. Then we had to buy a new set of static IP and point all the DNS information to the NEW IP ranges.

At the end all clients are happy. The C2 hack came from a known TK domain name that is known for malware.